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In the area of performance appraisal, libraries and other nonprofit organizations face a special 
dilemma of providing job feedback while maintaining a nonauthoritarian climate. This paper 
assesses the utility of four approaches to this problem: behavioralism, minimal model, heuristic 
literature, and tacit knowledge from in-house experimentation. Part one argues that sources of 
rater error are generally intractable and, concomitantly, that behavioral appraisal methods are 
ineffective. Part two takes up the widespread notion that performance appraisal, as a matter of 
ethics, should be less ambitious and important. The third part describes the heuristic literature 
in this field as a "folk-science." The next part surveys the experience with in-house experi-
ments in the social and behavioral sciences. Then, the final part of the paper draws some con-
clusions about the relative utility of the different approaches and offers a suggestion as to the 
future procedure in this field. 
he literature on performance 
appraisal has been written 
largely in terms of two contrast-
ing emphases. On the one hand 
-are those writers, principally in the fields 
of business and applied psychology, who 
propose multitrait-multimethod appraisal 
systems. This behavioral approach has a 
rich, half-century history of research, but 
it has developed unevenly. Investigation 
of most of the possible types of rating for-
mats has probably been pushed to the lim-
its of its usefulness, while study of organi-
zational factors surrounding the appraisal 
process is still rudimentary .1 Underlying 
the concepts and procedures of the behav-
ioral approach is the basic notion that 
some combination of appraisal methods 
can be devised to control rater error. 
At the other extreme is a smaller group, 
which argues that appraisals should be 
scaled down and made less important, es-
pecially for salary and rewards adminis-
tration. This argument is roughly a 
quarter-century old but has not been ad-
vanced empirically. It draws on Douglas 
McGregor's classic contention that super-
visors and subordinates distrust apprais-
als for fundamentally sound reasons: few 
supervisors want to play God; at the same 
time, every subordinate seeks to protect 
the integrity of his or her own personality, 
as well as to obtain valued rewards .2 
In the gap between the two emphases is 
a heuristic perspective common to jour-
nals geared toward practitioners (e.g., 
Harvard Business Review) and to library sci-
ence. It is found mainly in lists of recom-
mendations about what to avoid when 
evaluating people and how to motivate 
.them in the process. 
Although the literature in the library 
field over the past ten years testifies to a 
growing concern about the need for better 
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appraisal methods, 3 general discussions 
have not been followed up by experimen-
tal research that describes how particular 
methods affect performance at work, the 
state of morale, or the margin of error. 
As an approach to performance ap-
praisal, in-house experimentation is a 
novelty in the social and behavioral sci-
ences. In part, interest in it can be traced to 
the gradual unfolding of two interdiscipli-
nary concerns that pervade the so-called 
post-behavioral movement. These con-
cerns are the issue of certainty versus use-
fulness of research and the question of 
whether human interaction and social ar-
rangements can be understood with a dis-
engaged consciousness. However, the ac-
tual practice of in-house experimentation 
has been limited because of the difficulty 
involved. 
This paper assesses the utility of differ-
ent approaches to performance appraisal 
for nonprofit organizations. The first sec-
tion reviews the behavioral approach in 
three areas: (1) sources of rater bias and 
variance in the traditional supervisor-
subordinate context; (2) problems inher-
ent in alternative appraisal contexts; and 
(3) the status of several common appraisal 
techniques. The second section discusses 
the minimal appraisal, with particular ref-
erence to the dilemma of providing better 
job feedback while preserving a non-
authoritarian climate. The third section 
describes the heuristic approach to perfor-
mance appraisal, focusing on two prob-
lems in this area: the valuing aspect of ap-
praisals, and the limitations of common 
sense. The fourth section contains a re-
view of the experience with in-house ex- ' 
periments. The fifth and concluding part 
provides a brief summary that calls for ad-
aptation of in-house experimentation and 
development of tacit (personal) knowl-
edge. 
The term performance appraisal must be 
broadly interpreted since it covers place-
ment and promotion decisions, salary and 
rewards administration, motivational and 
developmental counseling, and criteria 
for the evaluation of personnel practices. 
This paper discusses all of these matters, 
but focuses on the last one; legal concerns, 
such as due process, are not discussed. 
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The term nonprofit organization requires 
comment. Administration texts distin-
guish among three sectors: business en-
terprises, government agencies, and non-
profit organizations. Nonprofit organiza-
tions are distinguished from the other sec-
tors by having ambiguous means and 
ends, little or no job feedback, and a ten-
dency not to monitor their environments. 
Whereas the characteristics and earnings 
of nonprofit workers may differ substan-
tially from workers in business or in gov-
ernment, there is no evidence that job ori-
entations or other subjective behaviors 
vary across the sectors. 4 But the term is 
preferable to some others, such as 
knowledge-based industries5 or organized 
anarchies. 6 
I. BEHA VIORALISM 
Rater Bias and Variance 
There exist severe problems in obtaining 
(1) ·accurate supervisor ratings of job be-
havior, even on a single performance di-
mension; and (2) agreement among raters 
on a ratee' s composite, comparative eval-
uation. Although rater agreement is no 
guarantee of accurate results, rater dis-
agreement does signal the presence of er-
ror. Two fundamental sources of rater 
variance can be singled out: bias and halo 
error. Many specific sources of variance 
can be partially remedied or at least ac-
counted for in appraisals, whereas bias 
and halo error remain intractable. 7 
By all accounts, rater bias (i.e., prefer-
ence or prejudice, whether conscious or 
unconscious) is the most serious common 
problem of performance appraisals. A 
substantial body of empirical literature 
demonstrates what one might expect from 
everyday experience: people tend to rate 
people like themselves more favorably. 8 
According to pers.~mal construct theory, 
each individual relies on a set of his or her 
own characteristics to make judgments 
about others. Thus, "more effective" 
managers value initiative, planning abil-
ity, perseverance, and broad knowledge; 
"less effective" managers value consider-
ation, tact, cooperation, teamwork, and 
loyalty .9 In the same way, raters are differ-
entially accurate in identifying "correct" 
and "incorrect" job behaviors. 10 Even 
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when raters focus on a single behavior or 
trait, subjectivity breeds variance .11 
Halo error is committed by raters relying 
on a summary impression of each ratee 
rather than distinguishing among the lev-
els of performance that individuals exhibit 
on different job dimensions. Evaluation of 
any one dimension is not synonymous 
with performance appraisal as a whole. 12 
A number of reports conclude that no ap-
praisal instrument or amount of education 
or experience is satisfactorily resistant to 
halo error. 13 Training sessions in which 
participants are urged not to commit this 
error run two related risks. One is that in-
dividual raters are not capable of accu-
rately identifying ratees' strong and weak 
performance areas. "Thus, it is possible 
that reducing halo may also lead to re-
duced reliability. " 14 The other risk is that 
"making greater distinctions among dif-
ferent performance categories may lead to 
a reduction in interrater reliability" as 
well .15 
Possible upper limits in reliability of per-
formance ratings were explored in one ex-
periment by creating a nearly ideal envi-
ronment in which actors played jobs 
familiar to the raters. Results indicated an 
inborn ''ceiling for interrater agreement in 
judging perforrnance."16 Given what ap-
pear to be human limitations associated 
with halo error, some behavioral research-
ers are turning away from efforts to con-
trol halo error and toward study of the 
kinds of cues people depend upon in mak-
ing summary evaluations of others. Per-
sonal construct theory is one example of 
this shift in theoretical approach. 
Another example of the new research 
centers on attribution theory in the field of 
social psychology. 17 This theory seeks to 
explain by a two-stage process people's 
naive assumptions about the causes of 
their own and others' behavior. In the first 
or diagnostic stage, the supervisor, pre-
sented with an incident of poor perfor-
mance (e.g., tardiness, a missed · dead-
line), tries to determine the cause by 
sorting through a variety of informational 
cues. Such attribution involves a judg-
ment about whether the cause was inter-
nal to the subordinate·( e.g., his or her atti-
tude, ability, or effort) or external to the 
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subordinate (e.g., task difficulty, lack of 
support, insufficient information). 
The diagnostic stage is typically domi-
nated by self-serving biases. A number of 
empirical studies show that people think 
their own behavior stems from external 
forces, while others' behavior sterns from 
internal factors. 18 Thus, in the case of un-
satisfactory job performance, the supervi-
sor is likely to blame internal causes (i.e., 
the ratee), while the subordinate is likely 
to blame external events (i.e., things be-
yond his or her control). 
At the decision stage the supervisor can 
either modify the job or tell the subordi-
nate to "change." Usually, the latter 
course is easier. This tendency toward in-
ternal attribution is strengthened when 
the outcome of unsatisfactory perfor-
mance is serious-even though the out-
come may have been beyond the subordi-
nate's control. However, when poor 
performance occurs without serious con-
sequence, the supervisor is more likely to 
overlook the problem. 19 Attribution the-
ory holds that, for more effective apprais-
als, supervisors should focus on the be-
havior and not the outcome. 
Alternative Rating Patterns 
In view of the inherent difficulties of the 
supervisor-subordinate relationship, vari-
ous other rating patterns have received at-
tention. Research on subordinate evalua-
tion of the supervisor is slim; also, the 
results of experiments do not lend them-
selves to clear generalization, apart from 
the evidence of a potential for frictions and 
misunderstandings in the use of this ap-
praisal.20 
Laboratory experiments, lacking any 
real threat of ratee retaliation, are theoreti-
cally interesting but tend to be artificial. 
One set of experiments on reverse evalua-
tion suggests a declining role for sex bias. 
Traditionally, women have been rated dif-
ferentlX from men, very often more nega-
tively. 1 At the University of Dayton, male 
subjects and female confederates worked 
in dyads on a task in which the female con-
federate was always chosen leader over 
the male subject. The selection of leaders 
was designed to appear in one of three 
ways to the men: as an arbitrary decision 
based on sex; as a matter of "chance"; or 
as a determination of ''merit,'' based on a 
(secretly rigged) male-female competition 
on a prior task. It was arranged for half of 
the teams to succeed at the task, the other 
half to fail. 22 
Results of the experiments indicate that 
appraisal of women as leaders is mainly a 
dual function of perceived fairness of the 
selection method and of task outcome. In 
the first instance, male subordinates who 
think that a woman was handed a leader-
ship position by virtue of her sex may try 
to restore psychological equity by down-
grading a woman's qualifications. The 
other, more powerful criterion of ap-
praisal for the woman leader is whether 
she succeeds at the task. 
Although these findings can reasonably 
be extended to a leader of either sex when 
the selection process is perceived to be un-
fair, they carry a particular warning 
against clumsy affirmative action pro-
grams. Also, they suggest that organiza-
tions can best insure a person's accep-
tance in a leadership role by assigning 
· relatively easy tasks at first. 
Peer evaluations have a curious quality. 
They tend to show more halo error than su-
pervisor ratings (i.e., less sensitivity to dif-
ferences among job behaviors);23 yet, they 
have high reliability: in the prediction of 
leadership potential.24 No general explana-
tion of this reliability seems to exist, but a 
number of specific findings are well docu-
mented: (1) friendship plays a minor role; 
(2) racial bias is to be expected; (3) brief ob-
servations of physical appearance and 
·manner are highly similar to observations 
based on considerable prior contact; and ( 4) 
peer evaluations are stable across poups, 
or as group composition changes. 
Self-ratings are dichotomous. When em-
ployees compare their own job perfor-
mance with the that of others in similar jobs 
at about the same salary, self-ratings are 
greatly inflated. As a rule, the higher the 
job level, the greater the inflation. For ex-
ample, among managers more than 80 per-
cent rated themselves in the top 10 percent 
category. 26 
On the other hand, self-appraisals for 
developmental purposes are much more 
reliable indicators of one's relative 
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strength in different capacities. Research 
has shown that self-appraisals of manage-
rial potential, when done confidentially, 
have fairly good job-behavior discrimi-
nant validity and are not unduly influ-
enced by halo error. 27 Overall, most peo-
ple have an intuitive grasp of their ability 
despite an unrealistically favorable per-
ception of their current performance com-
pared to others' performance. This self-
delusion is not necessarily bad. As 
research has also shown, high self-esteem 
is associated with many desirable work 
characteristics, such as motivation, pride 
in one's work, and physical and mental 
well-being. 28 
Appraisal Techniques 
Rater Training. Considerable attention 
has been directed toward attempts tore-
duce various rating errors through rater 
training. Recent studies suggest few solid 
leads about how to train people to observe 
and record job behaviors reliably. 29 Some 
writers argue that training programs 
should not be encouraged because, lack-
ing any theoretical model, "we do not 
know what truth in performance appraisal 
is."30 Others contend that some training, 
at least in communication skills, is neces-
sary because raters without any training 
''have the potential of doing more harm 
than good. " 31 
One drawback to rater training was 
mentioned above: the reduction in deter-
minant validity and expansion of interra-
ter variance after lectures about avoiding 
halo error. Another consideration is that 
the impact of training effects on subse-
quent performance appraisals does not 
last long. The most commonly cited 
"washout" period is one week. 32 The es-
sential point is that rater errors appear to 
be well-developed habits resistant to lec-
tures, practice, or warning. 33 
Rating Formats. Trait checklists for grad-
ing complex personal characteristics, e.g., 
cooperativeness and independence, are 
looked upon unfavorably in management 
circles and by the courts. From an organi-
zational standpoint, the main problem 
with trait measures is poor feedback: tell-
ing someone to "show more initiative" or 
to ''be a better listener'' does little good 
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without telling the person how to imple-
ment the advice in behavioral terms. 34 
From a legal perspective, personnel deci-
sions based on trait measures and affect-
ing protected classes (e.g., minorities) are 
deemed ''susceptible to partially and to 
the personal taste, whim, or fancy of the 
evaluator.'' 35 
These problems ae well known. What is 
less widely recognized is that trait mea-
sures and other ad hoc instruments have 
been shown to be no worse than, and 
most often superior to, behavioral scaling 
strategies. In one study of police job per-
formance, three rating instruments-a 
trait checklist, a behaviorally anchored 
rating scale (BARS), and a simpler numer-
ical rating scale-were compared with re-
spect to several critieria. Although no in-
strument was clearly superior for all 
purposes, the results taken together sug-
gest the following ranking from best to 
worst: the numerical rating scale, trait rat-
ings, and the BARS format. 36 This order-
ing of the relative superiority of the instru-
ments is contrary to theoretical 
expectations in a number of fields but is in 
general agreement with the reviews of the 
literature bearing on empirical testing of 
scaling strategies. 37 
Trait measures continue to be the most 
widely used tzy,e of performance ap-
praisal method. By one estimate, 90 per-
cent of today' s organizations evaluate an 
employee's effectiveness in terms of per-
sonal qualities thought desirable by those 
in the organizational hierarchy.39 
MBO. Management by objectives 
(MBO) and performance appraisal are of-
ten confused. The key to MBO' s success is 
goal setting tailored to the individual, 
while performance appraisal attempts to 
apply uniform standards to all employee 
behavior. Nevertheless, writers have 
commonly adopted two interconnected 
postulates that hold first, that MBO leads 
to higher performance; and second, that 
performance appraisal should focus on 
goal attainment. 
Underlying the first postulate is the be-
lief that participative goal setting is supe-
rior to assigning goals. The research on 
this issue is equivocal. It would appear 
that goal specificity and goal acceptance 
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can be attained as easily through assigned 
as through mutually set goals but that the 
establishment of higher goals is enhanced 
more by employee participation than by 
assigning higher goals or telling employ-
ees to do their best.40 Although there is a 
heavy emphasis in the literature on mu-
tual goal setting for the sake of profes-
sional employees, one review article 
found that such participation is "most ef-
fective among uneducated and minority-
group members, perhaps because it gives 
them a sense of control over their fate. ''41 
The second postulate, that performance 
raters should emphasize goal attainment, 
ignores the maxim of attribution theory: 
for more effective appraisals, raters 
should focus on behavior and not out-
come. Research has shown that if employ-
ees are evaluated on goal attainment, 
''they are likely to set low goals or reject 
higher goals imposed by supervisors," 
but that if employees are evaluated on per-
formance, "they will continue to set high 
goals whether the goals are attained or 
not."42 
Again, the role of participation is un-
clear. When one of the parties in mutual 
goal setting is ''more equal'' than the 
other (as is the norm), the question of 
management by whose objectives inevita-
bly arises. 43 Although quantification is not 
possible, observers seem to agree that 
MBO includes a lot of spurious participa-
tion, in which the fiction is maintained 
that the subordinate is making a real input 
into work planning and goal setting. 44 
Moreover, MBO is not for everyone. Job 
experience is necessary before participa-
tion makes much sense. For new employ-
ees, as well as troublesome ones and those 
who do not wish to participate, a more ap-
propriate personnel style than MBO is 
what behavioralists call the watcher. This 
means getting individual employees .to 
perform the way you want by reminding 
them that you are overseeing the situa-
tion. 45 
Interview. During the appraisal inter-
view, the supervisor and the subordinate 
are generally working at cross purposes .. 
Supervisors have to make judgments af-
fecting the subordinates' careers, morale, 
and relative share of rewards. Subordi-
nates need to verify their self-esteem and 
also obtain enough rewards. Such con-
flicts tend to generate ambivalent patterns 
of avoidance and defensiveness. 4 
Mutual avoidance of the risks of nega-
tive feedback has given rise to a process 
called the "vanishing appraisal," in 
which both parties implicitly collude, in 
effect, to keep matters short and sweet. 47 
Defensiveness springs from criticism of 
any sort. 48 To be effective at all, negative 
feedback should focus on specific behav-
ioral changes to improve job performance; 
but there is no hard evidence that well-
intentioned "constructive criticism" actu-
ally works. 49 
Research in this area focuses on the rela-
tionship between appraisal interview 
characteristics and subsequent job perfor-
mance. At least six major characteristics of 
an effective appraisal interview are well 
documented (although it is unclear 
whether they are all conceptually dis-
tinct). These are (1) the subordinate's 
prior preparation for the interview, (2) his 
or her opportunity to present ideas and 
feelings, (3) the degree of helpfulness of 
the supervisor, ( 4) the extent to which job 
problems are cleared up, (5) the extent to 
which goals are set, and (6) the absence of 
threats. Each characteristic has been 
found to be significantly related to im-
provement in later job performance, as 
well as to satisfaction with the appraisal 
process. 50 
II. THE MINIMAL APPROACH 
The nonprofit organization faces a spe-
cial dilemma in the appraisal process not 
ordinarily found in the business or gov-
ernmental sectors. The area of this di-
lemma, noted in a national survey of the 
quality of employment, 51 is located be-
tween work characteristics and organiza-
tional climate. On the one hand, the sur-
vey found that "nonprofit employees, 
less fettered by centralization and control, 
have more autonomy in doing their jobs, 
report more variety and challenge, and 
find that their education is matched to 
their job demands." The cost of such job 
autonomy and employee influence is lack 
of job feedback, whether from the work it-
self or from supervisors and peers. 
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On the other hand, as the survey also 
showed, nonprofit organizations gener-
ally attempt to draw together their em-
ployees by democratic arrangements, so 
that participation "may create a greater 
sense of commitment and involvement for 
employees and serve to clarify jobs and 
soften role stresses." The survey con-
cluded that efforts to import more busi-
nesslike performance appraisal systems 
into nonprofit organizations for the sake 
of job feedback could "centralize author-
ity, limit flexibility, stifle innovation, and 
. . . alienate employees not only from 
their service but also from their ideals. " 52 
This argument parallels the general call 
in some quarters to make performance ap-
praisals, as an ethical matter out of fair-
ness, less ambitious and important. 53 Al-
though no "minimal model" has been 
drafted, the basic position is that man-
agers should only attempt to identify ex-
tremes of performance and leave salary 
administration to impersonal forces, such 
as the seniority system. 
Apart from likely violation of legal 
ground rules, there are two fundamental 
weaknesses with the minimal approach. 
One is that the large area of indeter-
minancy in appraisals is an important fi-
duciary component of the supervisor's 
role, not an excuse to skip or minimize the 
appraisal process. On the whole, employ-
ees want valid job feedback. They may not 
be looking for criticism, but they do not 
want to spend their professional lives un-
informed about the character and results 
of their work. The other weakness of the 
minimal approach is that it downplays the 
need for goal setting and job feedback, 
and apparently ignores the ''Pygmalion 
effect,'' which has shown again and again 
that people perform best when they have 
high supervisor expectations, encourage-
ment, and visual attention. 
III. HEURISTIC KNOWLEDGE 
The heuristic side of performance ap-
praisal consists of strategies and rules of 
thumb for deciding which among several 
alternative courses of action promises to 
be the most expedient one. In the mathe-
matical and physical sciences, some heu-
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ristic rules can leap across logical gaps in 
problem solving. However, in immature 
or ineffective fields such as social sciences, 
heuristic knowledge consists of intuitive 
generalities, or aphorisms, which have 
neither the objectivity, nor the perma-
nence of an impersonal law. 
The heuristic potential of any field de-
pends on whether the important prob-
lems in that field ''can be effectively 
solved to yield some sort of genuine 
knowledge.'' 54 Study of the appraisal pro-
cess is a venture into tremendously com-
plicated problems of organizational be-
havior. Behavior includes not only overt 
acts but also subjective behavior, such as 
attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and de-
sires. No significant empirical or theoreti-
cal progress has been made in this field for 
a long time. A major review of the 1970s 
literature had little positive to report on 
performance appraisal: "Research con-
vincingly showed that instrumentation 
[i.e. a behavioral rating scale] has minimal 
impacts on psychometric errors, but that 
conclusion was pretty well established be-
fore. " 55 A more current assessment of re-
search work in organizational psychology 
concluded that "the theory/practice gap 
will close by a decrease in the relevance of 
theory, not by an increase in the quality of 
the practice. ''56 
About the only strong consensus with 
empirical support in the heuristic litera-
ture on performance appraisal deals with 
the fundamental importance of setting 
goals and giving feedback. Together, 
these are not only more effective than al-
ternative methods, such as participatory 
decision making or job enrichment, but 
may also be the major mechanisms by 
which these other incentives affect moti-
vation. Even money is a more effective 
motivator when bonuses are made contin-
gent on the attainment of specific objec-
tives.57 
But on issues of technique having a di-
rect bearing on how to set goals and give 
feedback-for example, the relative merit 
of assigned versus participatory goals, or 
of intrinsic versus extrinsic rewards, or of 
weekly versus annual appraisal ses-
sions-theo.rists plainly disagree. 
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The potential development of heuristic 
rules about performance appraisal is un-
dermined not only by the contemporary 
scarcity of empirical generalizations, but 
also by two chronic limitations: the valu-
ing aspects of appraisal, and common 
sense. 
In moving along a continuum from 
behavior-based, mechanistic tasks to those 
that are judgment based and, hence, or-
ganic in structure, the valuing aspect of ap-
praisal becomes increasingly salient. Even 
for moderately uncertain tasks, ''articula-
tion of a mutually agreeable standard of 
measurement is normally not possible.''58 
A series of studies on this shift from mea-
surement to valuing as appraisal uncer-
tainty increases demonstrated that value 
is likely to be assigned on the basis of 
"personal factors of relevance," and con-
cluded that personal judgments should be 
regarded as "critical and legitimate con-
cerns" in those situations "where contro-
versy and interest are joined. " 59 
As a general surmise, common sense is 
not an infallible guide to performance ap-
praisal. Herbert White60 and Richard De 
Gennaro, 61 among other writers, rightly 
argue for the value of experience, the 
proper attitude, and intelligence in library 
management; but Peter Drucker singles 
out two areas in which such tacit knowl-
edge is not enough. ''One is personnel de-
cisions, the other is marketing. " 62 Druck-
er's statement cannot be "proved," but 
there is supportive research on the nature 
of tacit knowledge (discussed below); and 
an old but unchallenged review of the lit-
erature concluded that the inability to 
judge the work traits and aptitudes of oth-
ers is itself a personality trait. 63 
Behavioral study of performance ap-
praisal is not simply stalled, nor its heuris-
tic knowledge merely ineffective. Given 
both a lack of empirical generalizations 
and a propensity for subjective evalua-
tions and personal feelings, the prevailing 
heuristic literature resembles a folk-science. 
This is "a body of accepted knowledge 
whose function is not to provide the basis 
for further advance, but to offer comfort 
and reassurance to some body of believ-
ers.''64 · 
IV. IN-HOUSE EXPERIMENTATION 
Broadly defined, the in-house experi-
ment is a nonrandom, quasi-empirical 
plan "to generate knowledge about hu-
man OJ>tions that go beyond the status 
quo." Its nonrandom character derives 
from the self-selected population (of par-
ticipants). Its quasi-empirical character in-
volves a shift from positivist logic (normal 
science) to tacit knowledge, which is par-
tial and subjective. To generate knowledge is 
not simply to make an inquiry; knowledge 
is the capacity to detect and deal with er-
ror. Finally, human options can apply to 
various aspects of organizational behav-
ior: work motivation, staff productivity, 
job enrichment, and participatory man-
agement, as well as performance ap-
praisal. 
Any stricter definition of the in-house 
experiment would be arbitrary. The philo-
sophical pluralism now current in the field 
of organizational psychology is one of its 
~hief sources of strength, 66 but it is also a 
broad and general feature; and the paucity k · of published reports on this type of experi-
ment makes it difficult to find models or 
paradigms. 67 The library science literature, 
for example, is full of narratives about per-
formance appraisal but only one article 
stands out as a true experiment, in which a 
definite plan leads to action that detects 
and attempts to correct a mismatch be-
tween intentions and organizational out-
comes.68 
Reports on in-house experimentation 
have been made, for the most part, by a 
small band of theorist-practitioners who 
have tied adult learning strategies to the 
study of organizational culture. 69 Their 
findings suggest two general reasons why 
an in-house experiment is not an ordinary 
plan of action: ''the inability of individuals 
to learn the skills to produce conditions of 
trust, candidness, and risk-taking under 
online conditions, and the lack of organi-
zational support for such changes. " 70 
With reference to the first reason; a fairly 
sophisticated study of the types of ''mas-
ter plans" people hold about managing 
their actions determined that ''individuals 
who are young or old, male or female, 
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white or black, rich or poor, powerful or 
powerless, may hold different espoused 
theories, they may act differently, but 
their interpersonal theories-in-use do not 
seem to vary.'' A model of this more or 
less universal behavioral pattern has four 
objectives: "(1) control the purpose of the 
situation, (2) minimize losing and maxi-
mize winning, (3) suppress negative feel-
ings, and (4) emphasize rationality."71 
Additionally, research work on leader-
ship points up a marked tendency for or-
ganizational administrations to avoid in-
house experiments. Supervisors at every 
level tend to have a basic lack of confi-
dence in others and do not believe that 
self-management traits-initiative, judg-
ment, responsibility-are widely distrib-
uted among subordinates. 72 And a clearly 
large number of supervisors hold to a 
lump-of-control theory. This type of 
theory-in-use assumes that there is a vir-
tually fixed amount of authority in any or-
ganization, so that whatever the supervi-
sor surrenders is a political and even a 
personal loss. 73 
All this suggests behavioral reasons 
why in-house experiments to alter the sta-
tus quo have seldom been put into action. 
On a theoretical plane, it seems unlikely 
that such experiments could evolve into 
strategic sources for model building be-
cause their methods and criteria consist as 
much of independent variables as of orga-
nizational behavior. Even MBO, in prac-
tice, has scores of variations. Accordingly, 
the confidence level of an in-house experi-
ment may decay quickly when findings 
are removed from the original setting. 74 
An associated theoretical issue centers 
on the intrinsically mental character of in-
house experiments (and of all social phe-
nomena). 75 Several labels for personal 
knowledge about organizational behavior 
in a particular setting have appeared (e .g., 
indwelli~ understanding, 7 armchair the-
orizing), but most writers have adopted 
Michael Polanyi' s 1972 term, tacit knowl-
edge.78 
Everyone uses tacit knowledge to make 
sense of the interplay of intentions, inter-
actions, and context in daily life. In an in-
house experiment, the role of tacit 
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knowledge-experience, intuition, intelli-
gence, guesswork-would be preeminent . 
in designing the approach and in selecting 
and interpreting the results: 
The research ought to be skeptical of positivist 
science when the unit of analysis is, like there-
searcher, a self-reflecting subject, when · rela-
tionships between subjects (actors) are influ-
enced by definitions of the situation, or when 
the reason for undertaking the research is to 
solve a Rroblem which the actors have helped to 
define. 
Such action research makes theorists ner-
vous because reliance on a participant's 
personal assessment implies a profundity 
that can be self-aggrandizing, defensive, 
or misinformed. To temper and round out 
subjective assessments, writers uniformly 
recommend the panel or team design for 
evaluation of nonrandom in-house experi-
ments. 80 
CONCLUSIONS 
Performance appraisal provides a modi-
cum of rationality and legality to key per-
sonnel actions, but there is no neat, objec-
tive way of going about it because of 
common, intractable sources of rater er-
ror. Of the four approaches to perfor-
mance appraisal under review-
behavioralism, minimal model, heuristic 
knowledge, and in-house experimenta-
tion-only the last one has the capacity to 
detect and deal with error. All the other 
approaches are of relatively limited utility. 
The essential difficulty with behavioral-
ism is that our state of knowledge about 
the determinants of appraisal effective-
ness lags far behind organizational needs 
and legal requirements. Behaviorally 
based methods, when evaluated for valid-
ity, relevance, discriminality, and free-
dom from bias, remain inadequate for the 
purposes that appraisals are intended to 
serve. This all-too-apparent deficiency in 
personnel administration has come under 
increasing legal scrutiny, 81 but there is lit-
tle documentation of the particular laws 
governing appraisals in small nonprofit 
organizations. 
No dramatic breakthroughs in the the-
ory or practice of performance appraisal 
are in sight. Practically all of the concepts 
and methods now in use have been 
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around for decades, and the types of 
method still to be tested do not appear 
promising. 82 Thus, the search for an ulti-
mate rating format was plainly exhausted 
in the 1970s when researchers quit hedg-
ing about the efficacy of behavioral scaling 
strategies. Rater training programs may 
be on the decline, but misapplications of 
MBO as a grand substitute for an appraisal 
system will likely endure. At the theory-
building level, a workable model of the ap-
praisal process would encompass such a 
vast array of human, social, and organiza-
tional variables that, if feasible, would re-
quire decades to develop. 83 
The antithesis of behavioralism is pater-
nalism, involving a minimal model with two 
chief premises: benign neglect of perfor-
mance appraisal; and "unconditional re-
wards in the sense that the amount of re-
ward that any individual receives is not 
dependent in any clear-cut way on how he 
behaveswithin the organization, but 
rather on the fact that he is a member of 
that organization.' '84 Although this model 
has been eclipsed in the management lit-
erature since the mid-1950s by others 
(e.g., MBO, participatory decision mak-
ing, behavioralism), it is still salient in the 
nonprofit sector and especially in the li-
brary field. 
Relaxation of performance appraisal 
and resort to across-the-board pay in-
creases may be entirely reasonable in 
some organizations at some times, such as 
during periods of budgetary restraint. 
But, over the long haul, the premises of 
paternalism tend to break down. First, 
where performance appraisals are not 
conducted, ''implicit evaluations will be 
assumed, and what managers say and do, 
even casually, will be interpreted and 
weighted as organizational evalua-
tions. " 85 Second, an unconditional re-
wards system based on membership and 
egalitarianism may well be dissatisfying 
not only to high achievers but also to 
many average workers, given the high in-
flation of self-ratings relative to others' 
performance. 
The aim of heuristic literature is to dis-
seminate usable knowledge in a particular 
field. In the social and behavioral sciences, 
the logic of positivism-that human inter-
action and society can be understood in 
terms of impersonal laws-has led to re-
search reports that are quite narrow in 
scope and technical in application. One ar-
gument of an emergent postbehavioral 
movement is that scientific certainty of 
knowledge, to a degree, is the enemy of its 
usefulness: . 
The effort to establish certainty almost always 
leads to large numbers of studies being done on 
a single small topic and to more and more care-
ful specification of the phenomenon. Once the 
phenomenon has been subjected to all the tests 
of certainty, it often winds up so complex that it 
is no longer useful to the practitioner.86 
Hence, the important function of heu-
ristic literature is to make scientific knowl-
edge understandable and accessible to the 
public. This literature holds few empiri-
cally grounded generalizations about per-
formance appraisal, but it certainly pro-
vides readier access to useful knowledge 
than could be obtained from a survey of 
the primary research in behavioral science 
journals. 
Analysis of the several main approaches 
to performance appraisal along the fore-
going lines leads to the inevitable conclu-
sion that performance appraisal is not an 
effective field. However, this does notre-
quire us to assume that nothing can be 
done, through deliberate plan, to improve 
the appraisal process. It seems reasonable 
to expect that real improvements can be 
achieved through a good measure of in-
house experimentation and some basic 
changes in the way we deal with un-
spoken assumptions about our ability to 
judge the work of others. 
Unlike rater errors in performance ap-
praisal, the problems of in-house experi-
mentation are not intractable. The sine qua 
non is II double-loop learning, " 87 which 
occurs when, in order to deal with error, 
behavioral values and tacit knowledge are 
questioned and altered. (Single-loop 
learning, by contrast, involves the detec-
tion of only routine errors that do not up-
set the underlying values of the theory-in-
use). 
The elusive goal of in-house experimen-
tation has been called reflexive power,88 or 
the enlightenment effect, whereby knowl-
edge of behavioral laws can modify or 
even nullify their impact on those who 
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share that knowledge. 119 However, discus-
sions in the literature about the enlighten-
ment effect are necessarily abstract be-
cause such tacit knowledge is 
II a-critical"90 -it cannot be articulated ex-
pressly. Thus, it does not pass easily as 
public (or heuristic) knowledge: 
Even if we begin to have an intuitive ·under-
standing of an organization's culture, we may 
find it extraordinarily difficult to write down 
that understanding in such a way that the es-
sence of the culture can be communicated to 
someone else. 
. . . But when we see the essence of a culture, 
the paradigm by which people operate, we are 
struck by how powerful our insight into that or-
ganization now is, and we can see instantly 
why certain things work the way they do, why 
certain proposals never get bought, why 
change is so difficult, why certain people leave, 
and so on. 
. . . It is the search for and the occasional find-
ing of this central insight that makes it all 
worthwhile .. . even if, in the end, we can 
share it only with colleagues.91 
In brief summary, perhaps an appropri-
ate skepticism of the approaches to perfor-
mance appraisal other than in-house ex-
perimentation is the comedian's dictum, 
"It isn't ignorance that does the most 
damage, it's knowing for sure so much 
that isn't so." These approaches involve 
only II single-loop learning" and do not 
have the capacity to detect and deal with 
basic error. In-house experimentation, by 
contrast, is a way of correcting overlearn-
ing without overintellectualizing the 
problem. 
In using nonexperimental approaches 
we judge the work and potential of others 
with a set of behavioral values and tacit 
theories-in-use. These may or may not be 
accurate or corrigible, but most organiza-
tions have never thought through what 
they regard to be desirable about personal 
traits and organizational behavior, what 
relative importance they give to the vari-
ous values they hold, or how these values 
can be incorporated into the current ap-
praisal system. We would be better off if 
we made a serious endeavor to assess and 
experiment with our theories-in-use, 
starting with more doubts about what we 
know ''for sure.'' 
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